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The Winter Olympics: Driving Urban Change, 1924–2022  
 
Stephen Essex and Jiska de Groot 
 
The delay in establishing a separate Winter Olympic Games until 1924, almost 30 
years after the revival of the Summer Games, reflected the fact that winter sports 
were not included in the original conception of the Olympics. Pierre de Coubertin 
objected to their inclusion partly because of Scandinavian fears that to do so would 
have possible detrimental effects on their traditional sports festivals, such as the 
Nordic Games and Holmenkollen Week.1 However, as the popularity of winter sports 
spread, the movement to include them in the Olympic programme gathered pace. 
Some of the early Summer Games included figure skating (London 1908, Antwerp 
1920) and ice hockey (Antwerp 1920) in their programmes. In 1924, a separate 
winter sports week was held at Chamonix six months before the Summer Games in 
Paris. Following the success of this winter sports week, the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) amended its Charter in 1925 to establish the Winter Olympics, with 
Chamonix retrospectively designated as the first Winter Games. Until 1948, the 
country hosting the Summer Games (held every four years) also had the opportunity 
to stage the Winter Games. Thereafter, the selection of the host for the Winter 
Games was subject to a separate competition decided by a vote of IOC members, 
but the event was staged in the same year as the Summer Games. From 1992, 
further change occurred, with the Summer and Winter Games being staged 
alternately every two years in order to maximize the profile of the Olympics and its 
television revenue (Borja, 1992).  
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This chapter documents and reviews the role of the Winter Olympics in changing and 
modernizing the built environment of its hosts, together with a consideration of the 
changing organization and funding of the event over time. Certain features, of 
course, remain relatively fixed. The construction or refurbishment of sports facilities 
has been a constant requirement on hosts throughout the history of the Winter 
Games, albeit with different outcomes based on local circumstances. In addition, 
although the detailed specifications may change, the range of sports facilities 
required for the event is normally standard. The main sports venues for the Winter 
Olympics include a stadium, slopes for slalom and down-hill ski runs, cross-country 
ski-trails, bob-sled and luge runs, and an indoor ice arena. The scale of provision of 
the associated infrastructure, such as the Olympic Village, Media Centre, hotels and 
transport, reflect the increasing popularity and interest in the event. However, the 
impact on host cities involves greater degrees of variability. In this respect, there are 
inevitable comparisons to draw with the Summer Games, which have witnessed a 
progression from the minor impact of the early Games to a more substantial, 
entrepreneurial and business-led approach to urban planning through Olympic-led 
development (see also Essex and Chalkley, 1998, 2002; Chalkley and Essex, 1999). 
The Winter Olympics are clearly different from the Summer Olympics in that they are 
staged on a smaller scale and in fragile landscapes, with less coherence in the types 
of venues required for the various competitions (mountains to urban ice rinks) and 
logistical challenges of transporting athletes and spectators to remote venues. The 
key questions addressed here are whether the Winter Olympics have had the same 
trajectory of development impacts on host centres, and whether the role of the public 
sector in the planning and management of the event has contracted in deference to 
the emergence of more entrepreneurial approaches (Cook and Ward, 2011).  
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To answer these questions, this chapter draws on the Official Reports of the 
Organizing Committees and identifies five sequential phases in the development of 
the event to offer a framework for organising and understanding the experiences of 
the past 22 hosts of the Winter Olympic Games from 1924 and the cities scheduled 
to stage the next two events in 2018 and 2022. These phases are characterized as: 
(1) minimal infrastructural investment (1924–1932); (2) emerging infrastructural 
demands (1936–1960); (3) tool of regional development (1964–1980); (4) large-scale 
transformations (1984–1998); and (5) sustainable development and legacy planning 
(2002-present). While business interests have consistently been instrumental in 
galvanizing a desire to stage the Games, the public sector has traditionally organized 
and funded much of the infrastructural investment for the Winter Olympics, as well as 
accumulating the main debts. Moreover, although private sources of capital, such as 
television rights and sponsorship, have emerged since 1984, the public sector 
remains pivotal for the organization of the event (Essex and Chalkley, 2004).  
 
Phase 1: Minimal Infrastructural Investment (1924–1932)  
The first three Winter Olympics (see Table 1 and Figure 1) were characterized by 
relatively low levels of interest and participation. The events were staged in 
settlements with populations of about 3,000, with less than 500 athletes competing in 
each of the Games. Nevertheless, the motivations of the hosts in staging the Games 
allude to some interest in the development prospects, especially given the emerging 
interest in winter sports tourism. Chamonix, in the Haute-Savoie department of 
eastern France, appears to have been volunteered as the host by the French 
Olympic Committee, which was no doubt cognisant of the need to have world-class 
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facilities to develop winter sports. Similarly, the local Chamber of Commerce was not 
slow to recognize the economic advantages for the town created by the popular 
interest in the Games (see Figure 2). Funding of the first Winter Olympics appears to 
have been shared equally between the public and private sectors. In 1928, the 
Games in St Moritz were led by the local authority and assisted the consolidation of 
the resort as an international winter sports destination.  
 
Although the initial idea to stage the Winter Olympics in Lake Placid (USA) in 1932 
came from the American Olympic Committee in 1927, it was the Lake Placid Club, 
which owned existing sports facilities in the area, who had investigated the feasibility 
of the event. The decision to bid for the Games was made only after a representative 
of the Lake Placid Club had visited a number of European resorts and the St Moritz 
Olympics of 1928 to convince himself, on behalf of the community, that Lake Placid 
could match the highest standards abroad and secure longer-term benefits from the 
investment required. To support the bid, in July 1928, the Lake Placid Chamber of 
Commerce set up a guarantee fund of $50,000, but it was in fact New York State 
that provided the main funding for infrastructural requirements for the event (see 
Figure 3). The involvement of New York State eased the concerns of some local 
residents about the magnitude and responsibility of the task (III OWGC, 1932, p. 43). 
The organization of the event was a partnership between New York State, Essex 
County Park Commission, North Elba Town Board, North Elba Park Committee and 
Lake Placid Village Board (Ibid., p. 74). In 1932, substantial funding from New York 
State led to the establishment of the New York State Olympic Winter Games 
Commission to ensure that the money was spent wisely (Ibid., p. 60), which is a 
model that has been followed in subsequent Games.  
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Many of the hosts of the early Winter Olympics were especially aware of the long-
term viability of facilities when deciding whether to stage the event, mainly because 
of the settlement’s small size and limited capacity to sustain expensive, high-order 
facilities. For example, the skeleton2 run constructed at the eastern Swiss resort of 
St Moritz for the 1928 Games proved to be an expensive and unviable legacy. Fewer 
than 30 people used the facility after the Games. As a result, the organizers of the 
subsequent Games at Lake Placid 1932 questioned whether the projected cost 
($25,000) of a similar facility could be justified.3 In light of the expected high costs 
and low post-use4, the event was eliminated from the programme at Lake Placid and 
was not re-introduced until Salt Lake City (Utah) in 2002.  
 
In contrast to this prudence, the Lake Placid organizers were criticized for the 
extravagance of building an indoor ice rink very late in the preparations. The plan 
was not supported by the State of New York because of the proposed costs 
($375,000). The organizers were responding to a suggestion by the IOC President 
that such a facility would provide an alternative venue for events in the case of bad 
weather (which had so badly disrupted the St Moritz Games 1928) and would also 
be a tangible and physical memorial to the event. The site for the rink was cleared 
and, with the prospect of a derelict site in the middle of town, the authorities were 
forced to fund the construction via a bond issue (Ortloff and Ortloff, 1976, p. 77). 
According to the organizers, the indoor ice rink proved its worth by providing an 
alternative venue for skating events affected by the unseasonably warm weather and 
so prevented the programme from being disrupted (III OWGC, 1932, p. 154).  
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The construction of Olympic Villages or new hotels was certainly not justified in this 
first phase because of fears of over-provision. Instead, existing accommodation 
within a wide geographical catchment area were adapted and, if necessary, 
upgraded for winter occupation. Hotel and cottage owners in the vicinity of Lake 
Placid were urged to ‘winterise’ their summer accommodations by the organizers of 
the Games of 1932 in an effort to house the expected 10,000 visitors. As no 
additional accommodation capacity was developed near the venue, accommodation 
in Montreal, which was three and a half hours from Lake Placid, had to be used to 
cater for the demand (III OWGC, 1932, p. 112).  
 
Despite the small scale nature of the event in Phase 1, some Olympic-related 
developments proposed for early Winter Games raised environmental protests, 
marking an issue which was to become much more of a prominent concern in later 
phases. In March 1930, a local action group (the Association for the Protection of the 
Adirondacks) brought a successful legal action against a proposed Olympic bob-sled 
run for the Lake Placid Games on environmental grounds and because building on 
state land was unconstitutional. As a result, a less sensitive site was found at South 
Meadows Mountain, later renamed Mount Van Hoevenberg (Ibid.).  
 
Phase 2: Emerging Infrastructural Demands (1936–1960)  
The second phase bears many of the hallmarks of the first phase: host centres were 
generally small (normally less than 13,000 residents), and had been offered as hosts 
by a combination of National Olympic Committees, Sports Federations and local 
authorities, with infrastructural investment funded predominantly by the public sector. 
The key difference was that, by 1936, there was substantial growth in the number of 
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participating countries and athletes. Investment in Olympic-related infrastructure 
continued to be constrained by the same factors of long-term viability as in the first 
phase, but with the added pressures created by the temporary influx of larger 
numbers of competitors and spectators. Initial plans for an Olympic Village at Cortina 
d’Ampezzo in northern Italy for the Winter Games of 1956 were abandoned after 
opposition from local hoteliers who feared the effect of an increase in the town’s 
accommodation capacity on their businesses (CONI, 1956, p. 267). The award of the 
1960 Games to Squaw Valley, according to the organizers, had transformed a 
remote mountain valley into a ‘throbbing city’ (California Olympic Commission, 1960, 
p. 27). Although the development of the Olympic Village for Squaw Valley 1960 was 
out of scale with the small local community, but was considered necessary because 
of the number of athletes now requiring accommodation and because local hotel 
capacity was required for officials and journalists (Chappelet, 1997, p. 83). Yet, it 
was only a temporary construction as the town’s small population (c. 4,000) meant 
there was no viable post-Olympic use.  
 
The main exception in this phase was the Norwegian capital Oslo, which hosted the 
Winter Olympics of 1952. With a resident population of 447,100, the city was by far 
the largest centre to have hosted the Games by that date. The larger population 
created new opportunities for the type of facilities provided, as the post-Olympic 
viability and future use was more assured. In the period before 1960, Oslo was also 
the only host to have built an Olympic Village, albeit it was dispersed in various 
locations around the city with planned post-Olympic uses such as university halls of 
residence, a hospital and an old people’s home (Organisasjonskomiteen, 1952, pp. 
23, 42). However, new infrastructural requirements were also created by the 
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increased size of the host settlements. For example, larger urban centres were often 
at some distance from competition sites. Large numbers of athletes and spectators 
required transport to cover considerable distances to isolated locations in difficult 
terrains and within limited time-frames, sometimes compounded by adverse weather 
conditions. Investment in transport infrastructure, such as new roads, bridges and 
ski-lifts, therefore became essential to the operation of the Oslo Games of 1952 and 
subsequent events.  
 
Phase 3: Tool of Regional Development (1964–1980)  
The third phase (1964–1980) is characterized by a number of definite shifts: an 
expansion of the number of athletes, appreciably larger host centres and the 
emergence of regional development and modernization as a key motivation for 
staging the Games. Four of the five hosts during this period had populations of more 
than 100,000, with the other having more than one million. Only Lake Placid in 1980 
had a level of population similar to those of previous phases. Both private 
development companies and local authorities recognized the potential of the Winter 
Olympics for justifying major infrastructural investment as part of broader 
modernization programmes. Television revenue was also emerging and grew 
substantially as a source of income during this phase, which began to shift the onus 
of the funding from the public sector to the private sector, although the local public 
sector remained central to the organization of the event. In 1964, the Innsbruck 
Games received $597,000 from television rights, while the 1980 Lake Placid Games 
received $15.5 million.  
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Partly because of their increased size, the Winter Olympics were recognized as a 
tool of regional development from the 1960s. The Innsbruck Winter Games of 1964 
was used as a showcase for Austrian businesses, especially those related to ski 
equipment (Espy, 1979, p. 90). The modernization of the Isère Department was 
accelerated by the Grenoble Games of 1968 (Borja, 1992) and as a means of 
remodelling its planning system after a period of rapid growth (1946–1968) (COJO, 
1968, p. 46) (see Figure 5). The Sapporo Games of 1972 were viewed by the 
Japanese government as a unique economic opportunity to invigorate the northern 
island of Hokkaido (Borja, 1992). Most of the spending was on investment in the 
urban infrastructure, with less than five per cent of capital improvements for these 
Games expended on sports facilities (Hall, 1992, p. 69).  
 
With the choice of host centres with larger populations after 1960, the post- Games 
viability of a purpose-built Olympic Village became more assured, usually as a 
residential area of the host settlement or a student hall of residence for a local 
university or college. For example, the Olympic Village at Grenoble was built in a 
Priority Urbanization Zone and subsequently was used as an 800-room university 
hall, a 300-room hostel for young workers and a tower block with 52 apartments 
(COJO, 1968, p. 71) (see Figure 4). In Innsbruck, which staged the Games of both 
1964 and 1976, the organizers were forced to build an Olympic Village for each 
event. The four apartment blocks built for the Winter Games of 1964 were not 
available for the Games of 1976 as they had become a residential suburb of the 
town in the interim. The second Olympic Village, consisting of 19 apartment blocks, 
was therefore built on an adjacent site. The 1976 organizers later reported that 
having to build another Village was, perhaps, rather extravagant, as not all the 
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athletes wished to stay there, some preferring to be closer to event sites. In 
retrospect, they felt that accommodating athletes in hotels might have been 
preferable from cost, security and transport perspectives (HOOWI, 1967, p. 400). 
Nevertheless, the two Olympic Villages had created a new residential area at Neu-
Arzl in East Innsbruck (Chappelet, 1997). 
 
Olympic-related investment in transport infrastructure was often central to the 
regional development objectives. Road construction accounted for 20 per cent of the 
total investment for the Grenoble Games of 1968 in the French Alps (COJO, 1968, p. 
46), and was designed to decentralize the region and facilitate economic growth. The 
investment included a motorway link from Grenoble to Geneva, which acted as a 
catalyst for the regional economy and transformed the host town into a major 
conference and university centre (Chappelet, 2002a, p. 11). The city’s old airport at 
Grenoble-Eybens was closed to make way for the Olympic Village and was replaced 
by two new airports at Saint-Etienne-de-Saint-Geoirs and Versoud (COJO, 1968, p. 
290). For the Sapporo Winter Olympics in 1972, transport investments included 
extensions to two airports, improvements to the main railway station, 41 new or 
improved roads (213 kilometres) and the construction of a rapid transit system (45 
kilometres). This last project had already been started by the City of Sapporo, but 
was completed for the Winter Games using government funding.  
 
With the increasing scale of the Winter Olympics, the risks associated with staging 
the Games became greater. First, warnings about the long-term limitations of the 
event as a tool of regional development began with the debt accumulated by the 
organizers of the Grenoble Games, which was eventually paid off by 1995 (Terret, 
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2008, p.1904), together with the abandonment or demolition of some of its venues. It 
was also during this third phase that the award of the Winter Olympics of 1976 to 
Denver had to be reassigned, which is the only time in Olympic history that this has 
happened (Olson, 1974). The reason was local concern about the rising cost of the 
event and about how the organizers, led by business interests, were ignoring 
environmental considerations. An action group, ‘Citizens for Colorado’s Future’ was 
successful in placing the issue on the State and City ballots in November 1972. The 
citizens then had a vote on whether the Games should be staged using state 
funding. The turnout was high (93.8 per cent) and 60 per cent voted against the 
Olympics, which meant that both state and federal funding for the event would not be 
forthcoming. Denver was therefore forced to withdraw its candidacy for the Winter 
Games of 1976, which were then staged in Innsbruck at short notice. Second, the 
changing scale of the event affected the character and operation of the Games. One 
of the consequences of the Winter Olympics being staged in larger cities and across 
whole regions was that the focus and impact of the event became dissipated. Critics 
claimed that the size and dispersed geography of the Games had detracted from the 
camaraderie of the event and increased transport problems. 
 
In other hosts, efforts were made to mitigate the environmental impacts, though in 
different ways. For the 1972 Sapporo Games, the only mountain close to the host 
city and suitable for downhill ski events was Mount Eniwa, within the Shikotsu-Toya 
National Park. The National Park Council gave permission on condition that all 
related facilities were removed and the terrain in the affected area restored to its 
original state. A comparable instance concerned the 1980 Games at Lake Placid, 
where the town itself lay within Adirondack Park, designated in 1971 and regulated 
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by Adirondack Park Agency. The park’s public lands were directly administered by 
the State Department of Environmental Conservation, which also operated bob-sled 
and luge runs, the biathlon and cross-country trails and the Whiteface Mountain Ski 
area (LPOOC, 1980, p. 18). The extensions of the ski jumps, originally built for the 
1932 Games, had to comply with standards set by the Adirondack Park Agency and 
the Federal Environment Agency (Ibid., p. 38).  
 
Phase 4: Large-Scale Transformations (1984–1998)  
The fourth phase (1984-1998) is characterized by the most significant increase in 
participation in the Winter Games. By 1994, the ratio of support staff to athletes was 
6.5 times bigger than in 1956. Numbers of athletes were also growing, with over 
2,000 athletes at Nagano in 1998 (Chappelet, 2002b). The accommodation of 
athletes, media and spectators became a substantial infrastructural challenge in 
itself. After 1988, two or more Olympic Villages became necessary to accommodate 
athletes closer to their event venues. Separate villages for the media were also 
necessary. These demands have favoured centres with larger populations. Perhaps 
more significantly, television revenue rose from $91.5 million in 1984 to $513 million 
in 1998, with the additional revenue partly funding ever larger and more ambitious 
urban redevelopment.  
 
These various changes intensified the advantages of placing the Games in host 
centres with larger populations. In this phase, the Games were staged in centres 
with an average population of about 298,000, although three of the five hosts have 
been substantially larger and two smaller. The role of the Winter Games as a means 
to secure major urban infrastructural change and modernization has intensified. The 
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Games staged in Sarajevo in 1984, therefore, were taken as an opportunity to 
modernize the city by the government. The motivation for the Calgary Games in 
Canada (1988) and the Lillehammer Games (Norway) in 1994 was to act as a 
stimulus to revive the local economies (e.g. XV OWGC, 1988, p.5). At Calgary, the 
Organizing Committee moved some venues originally selected by the Calgary 
Olympic Development Association to make them more viable after the Games (Ibid.) 
and the Games also caused some facilities to be provided much earlier than would 
otherwise have occurred. For example, the construction of the Olympic Saddledome 
(20,000 seats, C$7 million), home for a professional ice hockey team established in 
1980, was fast-tracked to show the city’s commitment to its bid (Hiller, 1990, p. 124). 
Large investments required to stage the 1992 Albertville Games appear, however, to 
have made more difficulties for other northern French Alpine resorts seeking finance 
for restructuring (Tuppen, 2000, p. 330). This case shows that Olympic investment 
has ‘opportunity costs’ which may postpone or eliminate other forms of investment.  
 
Given the changing circumstances, smaller hosts in this phase faced problems in 
justifying investment in permanent purpose-built Olympic Villages. Albertville 1992, 
which had a population of only 20,000 at the time, renovated a small spa at Brides-
les-Bains as the Olympic Village rather than constructing a purpose-built facility. 
However, the village proved to be too far from the sports facilities, so seven smaller 
Olympic Villages were established in existing hotel accommodation closer to the 
event sites. After this experience, the IOC stated that it favoured the use of a single 
Olympic Village in future Games in order to promote contact between athletes from 
different countries (Charmetant, 1997, p. 115), although this aspiration has not 
proved possible in more recent events. At Lillehammer 1994, which had a population 
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of 23,000, a temporary Olympic Village consisting of 200 wooden chalets, was 
constructed. These examples were significant departures from the trajectory of large-
scale infrastructural investment.  
 
The increasing scale of the event has also necessitated more formal recognition of 
environmental issues in the planning and development of related infrastructure (May, 
1995). The intrusion of built structures into fragile environments, as well as the use of 
chemicals to create the appropriate snow conditions, has become a major issue in 
the preparations for the Winter Olympics. Most notably, the preparations for the 
Lillehammer Games of 1994 incorporated, for the first time, the principles of 
sustainable development. The proposed location of one of the main indoor arenas 
was moved to protect a bird sanctuary, while its heat circulation operated from 
excess heat from its refrigeration unit. Contracts with suppliers and contractors 
included environmental clauses. The approach influenced the IOC to add an 
environmental commitment to its Charter in 1996 (Cantelon and Letters, 2000), with 
the candidates for the Winter Games of 2002 being the first to be required to 
describe their environmental plans in their bid documents (IOC, 1999a, p. 5; Lesjø, 
2000).  
 
Phase 5: Sustainable development and legacy planning (2002 onwards) 
During the fifth phase (2002 onwards), the trend for the event to require large-scale 
infrastructural investment has continued, but with a greater emphasis on the 
protection of the environment, sustainable development and legacy planning. As a 
consequence, the Games have begun to be staged by large metropolitan cities 
together with their surrounding mountain communities, essentially making them 
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multiple-centre events (Chappelet, 2008, p.1897). There have also been other 
significant pressures which have altered the character of the Winter Olympics, such 
as the threat from international terrorism and reforms to the host city selection 
process following corruption over the award of the 2002 event. 
 
As noted earlier, Salt Lake City was the first host city to have been elected after 
having been required to outline their environmental plans in the bid process. 
However, the Winter Olympics of 2002 are likely to be better remembered for the 
corruption scandal that tainted the city’s election as host and for the heightened 
security threat following the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September, 2001 
(five months before the opening ceremony). The Salt Lake Bid Committee, making 
their second bid and determined to secure the event, allegedly made payments to 
IOC members for holidays, medical treatment and members’ children while at 
university or working in America, in return for support (Booth, 1999; Lenskyj, 2000; 
Toohey and Veal, 2000, p. 232). The allegation emerged in December, 1998 and 
was followed by an ad hoc IOC Commission of Inquiry and a US Olympic Committee 
Special Bid Oversight Commission (Mitchell Commission) in 1999. The Mitchell 
Commission concluded that the IOC’s lack of accountability had contributed directly 
to the gift-giving culture, which had fostered the actions of the Salt Lake City 
organisers (Kettle, 1999; Sandomir, 1999).  The IOC’s own inquiry excluded six 
members (in addition to four who had resigned and one who had died), issued 
warnings to ten members and exonerated three (IOC, 1999b). The President/CEO 
and Senior Vice President of the Salt Lake City Organizing Committee left the 
organization in January, 1999. The controversy led to reforms in the host city 
selection process, including the elimination of member visits to candidate cities and 
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the creation of a permanent Ethics Commission, as well as amendments to the 
composition of the IOC itself. These changes were relevant to the future selection 
and conduct of both the Summer and Winter Olympics. 
 
Similarly, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York in 2001 made the security risk 
associated with the Winter Olympics much greater. Salt Lake City was staging the 
Games only five months after the attacks, so the security measures were enhanced 
and placed centre stage. Strict constraints were introduced for local air space as well 
as access to zones within the city (Warren, 2002, p.617). The organizers spent 
$200m on security and public safety measures and deployed 9,750 security-related 
personnel during the Games (Salt Lake City Organizing Committee [SLOC], 2002, 
p.490 and p.114). Although security had been a major concern and expenditure 
since the Munich Games of 1972, the Salt Lake City Games set a new benchmark 
for the implementation of security plans and measures at the Olympic Games in an 
era of global terrorism. 
 
The development of infrastructure and facilities for the Salt Lake City Games was 
based on three Master Plans: for Downtown, the University of Utah and Park City. A 
total of seven permanent venues were constructed, with only three requiring 
investment by the organizing committee itself. The other four venues were built by 
public-private partnerships, with a further twenty temporary venues or overlays5 
(Ibid., p.187). There was significant investment in transport infrastructure, involving 
ten Olympic-related roads and highway projects and four non-Olympic related 
regional projects, including the reconstruction of two interstate routes and two light 
rail transit lines (Ibid., p. 179). 
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All Salt Lake City developments were subject to environmental management 
systems to minimize adverse environmental impacts. The Environmental Plan 
contained four ‘aggressive objectives’, which were all achieved. First, 95.6 per cent 
of all waste was recycled or composted to achieve the objective of ‘zero waste’ (Ibid., 
p.26). Second, the Games succeeded in its goal of ‘net zero emissions’ by offsetting 
its carbon footprint of 122,936 metric tons of hazardous and greenhouse gas 
emissions as well as 243,840 metric tons of pollutants in Utah, the US and Canada 
(Ibid., p.196). The event was certified as climate neutral by the Climate Neutral 
Network. Third, the event’s advocacy programme for urban forestry resulted in 
100,000 trees being planted in Utah and 15m trees planted worldwide (Ibid., p.26). 
Fourth, zero tolerance for environmental and safety compliance errors was 
successful (Ibid., 195-8). The environmental and sustainable development agenda 
had been clearly cemented as part of the organization of the Winter Olympic Games 
following those in Salt Lake City. 
 
The award of the Winter Olympics of 2006 to Turin, with a population of 1.4m, 
represented the use of the event as part of a strategy to transform an old industrial 
city into a modern post-industrial city, a scenario which is normally associated with 
the Summer Games. Turin as an industrial city had been almost totally dependent 
upon the motor car manufacturer Fiat for a century, and had become known as the 
‘Italian Detriot’ (Rosso, 2004, p.5). With the contraction of Fiat in the city in the 
1980s, involving the loss of 110,000 jobs by 2001 (Winkler, 2007, p.16), there was a 
need to forge a new urban identity to attract tertiary businesses and improve its 
tourism potential. 
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In order to modernize the city’s infrastructure, innovations were first required in the 
city’s governance structures. When Fiat had been dominant in the city, a tradition of 
industrial conflicts and strong economic interests inside the Municipal Council had 
prevented the creation of an overall vision or strategy for the city (Pinson, 2002, 
p.483). Instead, town planning interventions had only been allowed to act in a 
pragmatic and opportunistic way. Following the corruption scandals that led to the 
collapse of both national and local government in Italy in 1992, national political 
reforms were introduced involving the directly elected mayors with increased 
executive powers and resources (Winkler, 2007, pp.18-19). In 1993, the election of 
Valentino Castellani as Mayor (with backing from the Chamber of Commerce, the 
University and the Catholic voluntary sector) emphasized the importance of the 
internationalization agenda to the city’s revitalization and long-term future. This focus 
created a space for dialogue and an opportunity for organizational and 
entrepreneurial capacity to develop. A new ethos slowly began to evolve which 
placed the municipality at the centre of collective governance as facilitator with an 
emphasis on open regional partnership, collaboration and networks rather than 
centralized secretive confrontation and conflict dominated by Fiat (Pinson, 2002, 
p.489). Implementation of the emerging vision was assisted by over 15 years of 
political continuity achieved by the re-election of both Castellani and his successor 
(Chiamparino) (Winkler, 2007, p.23). 
 
An Urban Master Plan had been prepared in 1995 by architects Cagnardi and 
Gregotti to alter the city’s urban structure and create opportunities for regeneration. 
The Plan focused on the improvement of transport access and private-led 
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investment on brownfield sites within clear land use zoning and regulation. The 
organizing principle of the plan was the ‘Spina Centrale’, which was a north-south 
avenue along the railway line, which had fractured the city into two. The railway line 
was taken underground, as a means of increasing its capacity fourfold, which 
enabled the surface to be transformed into a 12 km, six-lane arterial road (Ibid., 
p.28). The change better reconnected the two halves of the city and established a 
new urban centrality and image along the central backbone (see Figure 5).  Along 
the route, four disused industrial areas totalling over 2.1 million m2 and owned by the 
public sector and major private companies (such as Fiat and Michelin) would be 
redeveloped as mixed use developments (see Figure 6). A new cross-rail system, 
the ‘Passante Ferroviao’, was introduced. Key functions such as libraries, theatres, 
regional government offices and higher education were developed on brownfield 
sites adjacent to the railway stations, often in iconic landmark buildings. A 
programme to improve the quality of neighbourhoods, public spaces and cultural and 
leisure attractions throughout the city was implemented (Falk, 2003). 
 
The award of the Winter Olympics to Turin, on 19 June, 1999, therefore enabled the 
scope and importance of the new vision for the city to be integrated (Rosso, 2004, 
p.17), prioritized (Pinson, 2002, p.485) and, above all, to be implemented. The 
Strategic Plan for Turin was formulated through a highly participatory process and 
signed by all relevant agencies in February, 2000. It outlined six overall strategies 
and twenty objectives, which would be achieved by eighty-four specific projects (see 
Table 2). Implementation was overseen by the Torino Internazionale Association, the 
‘Invest in Turin and Piedmont’ inward investment agency, and Turismo Torino 
(Pinson, 2002, p.485; Rosso, 2004, p.18; Winkler, 2007, p.28). The Olympics was 
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perceived as an opportunity to modernize the city’s infrastructures (Pinson, 2002, 
p.485) and galvanize the longer-term vision for the city. 
 
The staging of the Winter Olympics was also organized as a means of regional 
integration between the three urban centres (Turin, Grugliasco and Pinerolo), which 
provided venues for the ice competitions, an Olympic Village, Media Village, Press 
Centre and International Broadcasting Centre; and the surrounding mountain 
communities, which provided venues for the snow competitions and two Olympic 
Villages (Torre Pellice, Pragelato, Bardonecchia, Sauze d’Oulx, Claviere, Cesana-
San Sicario, Sestriere). The purpose of this strategy was to extend the benefits of 
Olympic investment beyond the city to the whole region through opportunities to 
upgrade ski facilities and structures and to extend the tourism season (Danselo, et 
al., 2003). Substantial improvements were made to the local road networks to 
increase the area’s tourism potential, as well as to benefit daily life for its citizens. 
The transformation of Turin as a European metropolis was also signalled with plans 
to connect to the high-speed rail lines to Milan (2009) and Lyon (2011), thus 
positioning the city in the dynamic Mediterranean arc of technopoles in southern 
France (Sophia-Antipolis and Montpellier) through to Barcelona (Falk, 2003, p.213). 
 
As with the other recent Winter Olympics, the Turin Games was notable for its 
emphasis on environmental protection and sustainable development. A strategic 
evaluation assessment (the so-called ‘Green Card’) was adopted by the Environment 
Department of the Turin Organizing Committee (TOROC) to assess the 
environmental consequences of proposed developments and to monitor 
environmental impacts6. This environmental management system was awarded 
 22 
ISO14001 status. All plans and projects were assessed by the Consulta Ambientale 
(Environmental Council) before implementation so that recommendations about 
environmental sustainability could be implemented. An ‘Ambiente 2006’ logo was 
awarded to companies who manufactured goods for the Olympics in compliance with 
predetermined environmentally sustainable criteria (TOROC, 2006, p.122), and local 
hotel accommodation was awarded an ‘Ecolabel’ for adopting sustainable practices 
(TOROC, 2006, p.124; Bottero, et al., 2012; Bondonio and Guala, 2011). The 
Games themselves offset 100,000 metric tons of greenhouse gases through the 
HECTOR programme (Heritage Climate TORino) (TOROC, 2006, p.122). Indeed, 
Turin secured advances in the minimization of the environmental impact of the event 
for future Games to emulate. The Turin Winter Olympics was noteworthy for its 
achievements in transforming the city’s structures for governance and in mobilizing 
the city’s long-term redevelopment plan. In this respect, Turin is the closest that the 
Winter Olympics have come in matching the transformational effects of the Summer 
Olympics in Barcelona, although there are some questions about the long-term 
trajectory of the Olympic legacies following the 2008 recession (Vanolo, 2015).  
 
The Winter Olympics in 2010 were held in Vancouver, Canada, which also 
emphasized its credentials in sustainable development (Holden, et al., 2008). The 
urban centre of Vancouver acted as the venue for the ice competitions and the 
neighbouring winter resort of Whistler provided the venues for the snow 
competitions. New and upgraded facilities were constructed, together with a rapid 
transit link between the airport and central Vancouver and an upgrade of the ‘Sea-to-
Sky’ highway between Vancouver and Whistler. The ‘performance goals’ of the 
organizers focused on accountability, environmental stewardship and impact 
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reduction, social inclusion and responsibility, aboriginal participation and 
collaboration, economic benefits from sustainable practices and sport for sustainable 
living (Chappelet, 2008, p.1896). The provincial government set up an independent 
not-for-profit company called ‘2010 Legacies Now’ to ensure that each region in 
British Columbia benefits from the Games, through maximising social and economic 
opportunities, building community capacity and expanding volunteer resources (2010 
Legacies Now, 2009). The agency was funded by grants from various levels of 
government, contributions by the private sector and investment income and 
undertook various programmes in schools education, sport and recreation, the arts, 
volunteerism and literacy to achieve its goals (2010 Legacies Now, 2008). It created 
a new model for securing ‘softer’ Olympic legacies related to people, skills and 
employability rather than simply the ‘harder’ legacies related to the built environment.  
 
Despite the apparent concern for securing a positive post-Olympic legacy, the 
organisers in Vancouver have faced criticisms. The onset of a worsening global 
recession in 2008 threatened to jeopardise the financial viability of many 
developments, including the Olympic Village where the city government had to 
subsidise the project in order to ensure its timely completion (O’Connor, 2009). 
Social impacts resulting from the effects of land speculation and reversals on 
promises of affordable housing produced substantial concerns about increasing 
homelessness in the city. During the pre-Olympic development boom, 1,400 low-
income housing units were lost from the Downtown Eastside neighbourhood in order 
to create more space for tourists and corporate investors (Esparza and Prize, 2015, 
p.32) through rent increases or conversions into high-cost condominiums or boutique 
hotels, resulting in increased evictions and homelessness. Indeed, the concern of 
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the authorities to present the best possible image of the city to the world led to 
various legislation (such as the Assistance to Shelter Act, 2009 which gave powers 
to local authorities to place the homeless into temporary shelters) and initiatives 
(such as the Project Civil City, 2006-08) to remove evidence of social inequality from 
the streets (Boyle and Haggerty, 2011). The PCC initiative involved increased CCTV 
surveillance; public realm improvements to beautify areas, encourage active use and 
design out crime; and deploy ‘downtown ambassadors’ to act as street concièrges 
for visitors and the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police on the ground (Boyle and Haggerty, 
2011). Between 2008 and 2010, anti-poverty activists staged an annual ‘Poverty 
Olympics’ to draw attention (by employing irony) to the ‘world class poverty’ in 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, including events such as ‘the poverty-line high 
jump’, ‘the welfare hurdles’ and the ‘broad jump over bedbug infested mattresses’ 
(Esparza and Price, 2015, p.32; Perry and Kang, 2012, p.591). 
 
Indigenous peoples objected to their political groups being co-opted onto the local 
Olympic organisation as a means for their artists, cultural performance groups and 
symbols to be appropriated in Olympic events, while continuing to live in 
disadvantaged conditions and the Olympics being staged in unceded and non-
surrendered indigenous lands (No Olympics on Stolen Native Land campaign) 
(O’Bonsawin, 2010, p.148).  Indeed, the use of an inutshuk as the symbol of the 
2010 Olympics was considered as disrespectful by some groups as it reduced, 
objectified and dehumanised over 630 First Nation Aborginal communities into a 
singular ‘culture’, which reflected the dominant colonial view of Canadian nationhood 
(Perry and Kang, 2012, p.584). Environmental protests against the construction of 
the ‘Sea-to-Sky’ highway through Eagleridge Bluffs resulted in twenty arrests and 
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two jail sentences. The cost of the Vancouver Olympics rose to over $6 billion 
(O’Connor, 2009) at a time of severe cutbacks to health care, the arts, education and 
social assistance (Perry and Kang, 2012, p.579). Public displays of opposition 
against the Olympics were the first to utilise ‘convergence tactics’, whereby activists 
are called to a particular location to protest using mobile/social media 
communications facilitated by the internet (Esparza and Price, 2015, p.24). The 
staging of the Winter Olympics had become as contested as their summer 
equivalents. 
 
The award of the Winter Olympics of 2014 to Sochi in Russia may represent the start 
of a new phase or even a step backwards in the trajectory of the event (Chappelet, 
2008, p.1897). The decision by the IOC in 2007 to award the Winter Olympics to 
Russia appears to have been a political gesture and/or commercial opportunity to 
extend Olympism into the former communist world, along the lines of the Summer 
Olympics of 2008 in Beijing. For Russia and President Vladimir Putin in particular, 
the Olympics was to be a national project and symbolic of a resurgent Russia 
(Orttung and Zhemukhov, 2014). The bid proposed to develop the small mountain 
village of Krasnaya Polyana in the Caucasus Mountains from almost nothing into a 
new ‘world class’ winter sports resort to be used for the venues of the snow 
competitions together with the existing seaside resort of Sochi as the venue for the 
ice competitions. Sochi is located in a sub-tropical coastal region, while Krasnaya 
Polyana, 49km away, is part of an alpine mountain range (see Figure 7). Besides 
eleven new Olympic sports facilities and over 19,000 new hotel rooms (IOC, 2007, 
pp.18 and 24), substantial investment was made in power and gas lines, 
telecommunications, water supplies and transport. No less than seven power 
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stations (some thermoelectric and hydro-electric) were constructed or refurbished to 
increase the capacity of the region’s energy network by 2.5 times and secure a 
stable power supply for the event and beyond (Sochi Organising Committee, 2009). 
A new terminal was built at Sochi airport, together with a new offshore terminal at 
Sochi seaport. A light railway was constructed from the airport to the Olympic Park. 
Transport between Sochi and Krasnaya Polyana was enhanced by the 
reconstruction of the railway to a double track line and a new motorway (IOC, 2007, 
pp.25-26). The total costs associated with these developments have been estimated 
at more than US$50 billion (Trubina, 2015, p.2) and so appeared to be at odds with 
the IOC’s concern to reduce the cost and scale of Olympic events. One estimate 
equated the cost of this government investment to be about 60,000 Euros per 
inhabitant of the region (Müller, 2012, p.697). 
 
Serious environmental concerns also existed over the preparations as some the 
venues were located in the Sochi National Park and the Caucasus State Biosphere 
Reserve (an UNESCO World Heritage Area). Initially, the National Park was to be re-
zoned to allow the construction of an Olympic Village in Krasnaya Polyana and the 
bobsleigh and luge runs in a buffer zone of the Reserve. In July, 2008, Vladimir 
Putin, then the Russian Prime Minister, ordered the Olympic facilities noted above to 
be relocated. Putin is reported as having stated that “in setting our priorities and 
choosing between money and the environment, we’re choosing the environment” 
(Finn, 2008). It later emerged that the boundaries of the reserve were changed to 
accommodate the development (Alekseyeva, 2014, p.165). An appeal by 
Greenpeace Russia to the Russian Supreme Court about these environmental 
concerns was rejected (IOC, 2007, p.14; GamesBids.com, 2007). Müller (2013, p.28) 
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argues that the sustainability agenda for Sochi was framed by and for an 
international audience and so was out of tune with the realities of environmental 
politics in Russia and national conceptions of sustainable development and nature-
society relationships (Müller, 2013, p.14).  
 
The Sochi Games were controversial in other ways, not least related to violations of 
human rights. During the land assembly for the Olympic infrastructure, concerns 
were raised about the expropriation of property and resettlement of residents with no 
right of appeal, together with the treatment of migrant construction workers who had 
to endure poor working and living conditions (Müller, 2014). Other issues raised the 
threat of international boycotts of the event, such as the discriminatory legislation 
against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender groups and a campaign by a 
diaspora of an indigenous group (Circassian) who had been defeated by tsarist 
forces in 1864 on the site of the Olympic facilities (Arnold and Foxall, 2014). 
 
Security concerns were also voiced over the 2014 Winter Olympics because Sochi is 
located close to the disputed region of Abkhazia (Georgia). A website 
(RevoketheGames.com) was set up to draw attention to Russia’s attack on Georgia 
in 2008 and to campaign for the 2014 event to be moved from Sochi to another host. 
In November, 2008, the Georgian National Olympic Committee requested that the 
IOC reconsider its decision to award an Olympics which would be staged close to a 
conflict zone. The IOC rejected the request because security was the responsibility 
of the Russian organizers and, of course, the 2014 Games were staged as planned. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Sochi Olympics presented a number of challenges 
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to the IOC’s concerns about the scale, cost and environmental implications of 
staging the games. 
 
The Future 
The host city of the Winter Olympics in 2018 is PyeongChang in the Kangwon 
province of South Korea, which shares a border with North Korea (Merkel, 2008). 
The potential of the event to act as an opportunity for reunification and contribute to 
world peace had formed an important part of the city’s previous bids for the Games 
in 2010 and 2014. Indeed, the two Korean teams had marched together at a number 
of Olympic Games between 2000 and 2006, but had failed to agree a joint team for 
the Beijing Olympics in 2008 (Merkel and Kim, 2011, p.2369). Its third and 
successful bid for the 2018 Games (in 2011) ironically did not feature prominently the 
idea of improving relations between the two Koreas and was a government-led 
project rather being led by local institutions (Merkel and Kim, 2011, p.2376). By this 
time, however, PyeongChang already had a number of venues completed or 
planned within a 30 minute radius with substantial financial support from the national 
government and strong public support (93 per cent approval) (see Figure 8). It won 
the IOC vote outright in the first round. To avoid any boycott of the 2018 Games by 
North Korea, South Korea might offer some competitions to be staged in the North 
and/or the two countries might field a joint team and/or arrange high-profile events 
around reconciliation and reunification (Merkel and Kim, 2011, p.2378).  This case 
represents a very real example of where the Olympic spirit may be able to contribute 
to reunification where other political means have failed. 
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The staging of the 2022 Winter Olympics have become more problematic for the 
IOC. Having started with a good field of potential candidate cities (Krakow, Lviv,  
Munich, Oslo, St Moritz-Davos, Stockholm), only Almaty (Kazakhstan) and Beijing 
(China) currently remain as willing hosts. Krakow, Munich and St. Moritz-Davos all 
withdrew their bids because local residents had voted ‘no’ to staging the event in 
referendums. The city government in Stockholm declined to offer financial support 
and Lviv withdrew its bid because of political unrest in the Ukraine (Associated 
Press, 31 May, 2014). Beijing, with its track record with the 2008 Olympics, 
appeared to be a credible bid, although it lacked a natural source of snow and was 
reliant upon snow-making technology. On the other hand, Almaty had limited 
experience in hosting major international events and presented some financial risks, 
but at least had copious amount of snow cover and had most of the venues 
constructed within a 30km radius (ABC News, 10 June, 2015; IOC, 2015b). The IOC 
vote on these bids takes place on 31 July, 2015 in Kuala Lumpur. 
 
The apparent increasing reluctance of cities willing to be hosts of the Olympic 
Games relates to the scale, cost and demands of both the event and the Olympic 
movement on these places. Reforms suggested by the Olympic Games Study 
Commission to control and limit the scale of investment in Olympic preparations at 
the start of Jacques Rogge’s period of presidency of the IOC (IOC, 2003) have 
resurfaced at the start of Thomas Bach’s term of office as IOC President (2013-). 
The Olympic Agenda 2020, agreed by the IOC in December, 2014, has revised the 
bid process to become an invitation and open dialogue between potential hosts and 
the IOC rather than as a tender bid, so that the Olympic-related infrastructure can be 
negotiated to suit the city’s long-term development needs rather than being imposed. 
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The IOC appears to be moving away from the concept of a ‘compact games’ by 
allowing greater flexibility in venue locations, which can be outside the host city or 
even host country (IOC, 2014; IOC, 2015c). The extent to which these reforms will 
increase the enthusiasm of host cities to stage the Olympic Games will become 
apparent over the next few years. Certainly, there might be the beginning of a trend 
away from cities in neoliberal economies who, whilst seeking investment from the 
private sector, are unable to raise substantial government subsidy. In contrast, 
countries with a strong state, substantial government funding, and a more top-down 
planning culture, combined with less concern for environmental issues and a greater 
push for modernisation and urban transformation, are emerging as the major players 
as hosts of mega-events in the early twenty-first century (Müller, 2011; 2012; 
Trubina, 2015). 
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
In parallel with the evolving experience of staging the Summer Olympics, a marked 
growth in the scale, complexity, sophistication, and attendant controversy is 
discernible in the history of the Winter Games since the 1920s. The chronological 
sequence of phases adopted as the organising framework of the chapter offers a 
means to understand both the broad changes in the scope and character of the 
Winter Olympics, and the specific circumstances that have affected 22 past and two 
forthcoming hosts of the event. Planning for the Winter Olympics (like the Summer 
Games) has built incrementally on the experience of past events, the gradual 
accumulation of knowledge and the desire to constantly raise the spectacle of the 
event. What emerges from this historical review are a number of clear trends and 
research themes. 
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First, the Winter Olympics has shifted from an event that has promoted winter sports 
tourism in single mountain resorts to and event that has begun to emulate the 
Summer Olympics in its ability to modernize and stimulate urban regeneration. It is 
now usual for the host of the Winter Olympics to comprise both a large urban centre 
and surrounding mountain communities. Nevertheless, the scale of investment can 
still represent a challenge to the hosts in ensuring that the post-Olympic legacy is 
positive and facilities are sustainable for what are specialised facilities dispersed 
around remote and mountainous rural regions. Indeed, the increasing scale of the 
event has introduced new infrastructural demands, such as major improvements to 
transport systems, enhanced security measures and projects integrating sustainable 
development. In some cases, the athletes’ demand to be closer to competition 
venues has required the Winter Olympic Villages to be fragmented into smaller units. 
Given such investments have associated opportunity costs, the extent to which the 
Winter Olympic Games therefore represents a cost effective and positive force for 
sustainable legacies and urban revitalization policies is much contested.  
 
Second, in economic terms, legacies appear mixed, with the impacts often 
experienced as an ‘intermezzo’, that is a short dramatic interlude yielding a poor 
long-term return on investment (Spilling, 1998). In Spilling’s research into the effects 
of the Lillehammer Games of 1994, new business start-ups were substantial 
immediately after the Games were awarded, but many did not survive. The impact of 
the event can also be uneven across different sectors. During the Winter Olympics in 
Salt Lake City, hotels and restaurants prospered (experiencing a combined 
estimated $70.6m net increase in taxable sales respectively), while retailers suffered 
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(with a larger net loss of $167.4m) (Baade, Baumann and Matheson, 2008). The 
tangible economic impacts might be short-lived but intangible impacts, such as the 
creation of new networks, skills and images, can have longer-term importance. 
Research into the effects of the 1988 Games on Calgary’s image in 22 centres in 
America and Europe between 1986 and 1989 showed an increased awareness 
immediately before and after the event but tended to dissipate after a few years 
(Brent Ritchie and Smith, 1991).  
 
Third, in social terms, it has proven extremely difficult to reconcile the demands of 
the Games with the kinds of built environment that might be suitable for residents of 
the locality after the Olympics have finished. Indeed, with the host city’s concern to 
use the Winter Olympics as a development and revitalisation tool, in order to create 
new spaces for inward investment and tourism as well as the best possible place 
marketing/branding, has often led to insufficient public consultation over 
redevelopment plans, the displacement of former inhabitants (usually disadvantaged 
groups) and increased street security and surveillance. In the post-Olympic period, 
redeveloped areas become gentrified and obvious representations of social equality 
and exclusion. In some cases, such as Victoria Park following the Calgary Winter 
Olympics in 1988, a process of residential obsolescence was triggered, whereby 
uncertainty about future mega events in a residential zone around a stadium 
impeded investment (Hiller and Moylan, 1999). Intertwined with these issues are 
those human rights violations (related to land claims, treatment of migrant 
construction workers and discrimination against minority groups) and the 
commodification of the symbols of indigenous people for Olympic marketing and 
external image. The emergence of local action groups opposing bids for Winter 
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Games in several potential hosts has been indicative of some local perceptions of 
the negative impacts (for example, Helsinki 2006 Anti-Olympic Committee; 
Nolympics!, Turin, 2006; No 2010 Network and Native Anti-2010 Resistance, 
Vancouver, 2010). 
 
Fourth, given that the Winter Olympics are staged in much more fragile landscapes 
than their summer counterparts, the environmental implications of staging the event 
have been much more prominent and evident, even in the earliest hosts. Habitat 
destruction, heat generation from refrigeration units, chemical pollution and 
unsuccessful restoration schemes have been common concerns in host settlements. 
Arguably, the sustainability agenda adopted by the IOC in 1996, and now ingrained 
in all Olympic events, albeit arguably a light green corporate environmentalism 
(Lenskyj, 1998), was a direct outcome of the criticism of the Albertville Games in 
1992 and the example set at Lillehammer in 1994. Each successive Olympic Games 
has subsequently claimed to be the most sustainable ever, although practices now 
appear to be relatively established in terms of recycling measures, low carbon 
emissions and/or offsetting, environmental procurement and compliance standards, 
and environmental monitoring. The extent to which the Sochi Olympics ran counter 
to the IOC’s expectations in some of these areas raised questions about the 
institution’s ability to hold host cities accountable to their bid promises and accepted 
international norms. 
 
Fifth, despite more entrepreneurial approaches to the urban management of the 
Olympics, the role of the public sector appears to remain central to the organization 
and, to a certain extent, the funding of the event. The initial motivation to stage the 
 34 
Winter Olympics might emanate from business coalitions and the generation of 
income through corporate sponsorship and television revenue, but it is public-sector 
expenditure that is usually pivotal to the success of the event. The French 
Government treated Grenoble 1968 as an affaire nationale, met 80 per cent of the 
basic sports installation costs and provided a subsidy of 20 million francs for 
operational expenses (COJO, 1968, p. 39). While the Albertville Games of 1992 
were originally conceived as a means of regional modernization by local 
businessmen, it was the French government that funded the project. Similarly, the 
Norwegian government covered the huge costs and debts of Lillehammer 1994. The 
staging of the Winter Olympics in Turin in 2006 was pivotal in the city’s 
transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial centre and the Sochi event in 
2014 represented a ‘national project’ to create a new ski and winter sports resort in 
Russia. 
 
Sixth, the debate about the increasing size of the Winter Olympics has been a long-
running affair. Preparations for the Oslo Winter Games in 1952 included 
consideration of a proposal to reduce the number of events. It was feared that the 
increasing size of each Winter Games would detrimentally affect their character and 
make it impossible for any town to undertake the necessary arrangements.7 There is 
no record of the response to this proposal but, in practice, the Games continued to 
grow. Avery Brundage, the IOC President from 1952 to 1972, criticized the huge 
expenditures at the Grenoble Games of 1968. He wrote: ‘the French spent $240m … 
and when you consider that this was for ten days of amateur sport, it seems to be 
somewhat out of proportion. With that kind of money involved there is bound to be 
commercialization of one kind or another’ (quoted in Espy, 1979, p. 136). As a result 
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of related controversies, Brundage hoped that the whole Winter Olympics would 
receive a ‘decent burial’ at Denver, the original host of the Winter Games of 1976 
(Espy, 1979, p.135). Nonetheless, the Winter Games has survived and, in terms of 
its scope and size, it has continued its upward trajectory. The risks of staging a 
Winter Olympics are now immeasurably greater as issues of financial debt, 
uncertainty over legacy, security and terrorism, political reputation and corruption 
can potentially taint the best prepared of hosts. The limited field of finalist cities for 
the 2022 event is the clearest manifestation of these concerns and, depending on 
the outcomes from the IOC’s Olympic Agenda 2020, a potential theme for the next 
phase in the trajectory of the Winter Olympics. 
 
Notes  
 
1. The Nordic Games, founded in 1901, were organized by the Swedish Central 
Association for the Promotion of Sports. The Holmenkollen Week is a leading 
Norwegian winter sports event.  
2. ‘Skeleton’ refers to a one-person sled which is driven by a competitor in a prone, 
head-first position down an ice track. The availability of the run at St Moritz meant 
that the event was held there as part of the 1948 Winter Olympics, although it was 
generally referred to as ‘toboganning’.  
3. Olympic Museum Archive, Lake Placid General file 1928–1991. Letter, G. Dewey, 
Chairman of Lake Placid, to M. Le Comte, President of the International Federation 
of Bobsleigh and Tobogganing, Paris, 9 November 1929.  
4. Olympic Museum Archive, Lake Placid General file 1928–1991. Letter from IOC, 
29 March 1930.  
5. Overlays are temporary structures such as walkways, which are required for the 
Games, but might be removed after the event itself. 
6. A quality benchmark ‘first published as a standard in 1996 and it specifies the 
requirements for an organisation’s environmental management system. It applies to 
those environmental aspects over which an organisation has control and where it 
can be expected to have an influence’ (BAB, 2010). 
7. Olympic Museum Archive, Oslo Correspondence COJO, 1947–1953. Undated 
draft of suggestion of the Special Committee regarding the reduction of the sports’ 
programme of the Olympic Games, Jeux Olympiques de 1952 Oslo Correspondence 
COJO, 1947–1953.  
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Table 1.  Host cities and candidate cities for the Winter Olympic Games, 1924-
2006 
 
Games Host city Host nation Other candidate cities 
1924 Chamonix France - 
1928 St. Moritz Switzerland Davos, Engelberg, (Switzerland) 
1932 Lake Placid USA Montreal (Canada), Bear Mountain, Yosemite 
Valley, Lake Tahoe, Duluth, Minneapolis, Denver 
(USA) 
1936 Garmisch-
Partenkirchen 
Germany St Moritz (Switzerland) 
1948 St. Moritz Switzerland Lake Placid (USA) 
1952 Oslo Norway Cortina (Italy), Lake Placid (USA) 
1956 Cortina Italy Colorado Springs, Lake Placid (USA),  
Montreal (Canada) 
1960 Squaw Valley USA Innsbruck (Austria), St Moritz (Switzerland), 
Garmish-Partenkirchen (Germany) 
1964 Innsbruck Austria Calgary (Canada), Lahti/Are, (Sweden) 
1968 Grenoble France Calgary (Canada), Lahti/Are (Sweden), Sapporo 
(Japan), Oslo (Norway), Lake Placid (USA) 
1972 Sapporo Japan Banff (Canada), Lahti/Are (Sweden), Salt Lake City 
(USA) 
1976 Innsbruck Austria Denver (USA), Sion (Switzerland), Tampere/Are 
(Finland), Vancouver (Canada) 
1980 Lake Placid USA Vancouver-Garibaldi (Canada): withdrew before 
final vote 
1984 Sarajevo Yugoslavia Sapporo (Japan), Falun/Göteborg (Sweden) 
1988 Calgary Canada Falun (Switzerland), Cortina (Italy) 
1992 Albertville France Anchorage (USA), Berchtesgaden (Germany), 
Cortina (Italy), Lillehammer (Norway), Falun 
(Sweden), Sofia (Bulgaria) 
1994 Lillehammer Norway Anchorage (USA), Öestersund/Are (Sweden), Sofia 
(Bulgaria) 
1998 Nagano Japan Aoste (Italy), Jaca (Spain), Öestersund (Sweden), 
Salt Lake City (USA) 
2002 Salt Lake City USA Öestersund (Sweden), Quebec City (Canada), Sion 
(Switzerland) 
2006 Turin Italy Helsinki (Finland), Klagenfurt (Austria), Poprad-
Tatry (Slovakia), Sion (Switzerland), Zakopane 
(Poland) 
2010 Vancouver Canada PyeongChang (South Korea), Salzburg (Austria) 
2014 Sochi Russia PyeongChang (South Korea), Salzburg (Austria) 
2018 Pyeongchang South Korea Annecy (France), Munich (Germany) 
2022 To be decided 
on  31 July 2015 
at 128th IOC 
Session, Kuala 
Lumpur 
 Almaty (Kazakhstan), Beijing (China).  
Withdrawn: Oslo (Norway) 
Source: Compiled by the authors from IOC (2015a).  
 43 
Table 2. The Strategic Plan for Turin, 2000 
 
Six lines of strategy 20 objectives (examples) 84 actions 
To integrate the 
metropolitan area into the 
international system 
 To develop 
international 
cooperation networks 
 To facilitate access to 
Turin 
 To improve mobility 
within the city 
 A standardized, 
integrated 
communication plan for 
the international 
promotion of Turin 
 Privatization and 
expansion of – and 
improved access to – 
Torino-Caselle airport 
 Participation in the 
creation of the Turin-
Milan and Turin-Lyon 
sections of the high-
speed railway 
 Construction of an 
underground rail 
network linking the 
various Turin mainline 
stations 
 Construction of a metro 
line between Collegno 
and Lingotto via Porta 
Nouva 
To construct metropolitan 
government 
 To create new forms of 
governance 
 To construct services 
for the metropolitan 
area 
 To institute a 
Metropolitan 
Conference 
 To constitute the Torino 
Internazionale 
Association to monitor 
the strategic plan 
 To create a 
Metropolitan Transport 
Agency 
To develop training and 
research as strategic 
resources 
 To strengthen a 
university centre of 
international level and 
appeal 
 To foster the 
development of 
research in tandem 
with economic 
initiatives 
 To promote vocational 
training and work-
training integration 
 To build new university 
sites 
 Enlargement of the 
Polytechnic 
 To involve research 
centres in international 
collaboration networks 
 To establish links 
between research and 
business 
 To create two business 
incubators within the 
city’s two universities 
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To promote enterprise and 
employment 
 To develop the 
innovative potential of 
the production system 
 To create conditions 
favourable to the 
development of new 
enterprise 
 To promote local 
development and 
active employment 
policies 
 To upgrade ‘technology 
districts’ by setting up 
shared services in the 
fields of training, quality 
assurance and the 
environment 
 To create a structure 
for technology transfer 
 To develop an 
aerospace centre 
around the Alenia 
company 
 To develop an Internet 
Exchange at the 
Environment Park 
 To develop an 
Information and 
Communication 
Technology Centre 
around the Telecom 
Italia and Motorola 
research centres 
 To develop an 
insurance and financial 
services centre 
 To create a new body 
to assist business start-
up activity 
 To support the 
‘territorial pacts’ 
launched by the 
Province of Turin 
To promote Turin as a city 
of culture, tourism, 
commerce and sport 
 To enhance and 
develop the city’s 
cultural heritage 
 To coordinate cultural 
activities and to 
schedule events of 
international standing 
 To develop the tourist 
industry 
 To position 
Turin/Piedmont in the 
national and 
international tourist 
markets 
 To support growth and 
innovation of the 
region’s commercial 
 To rethink the city’s 
system of museums 
and relocate the 
Egyptian Museum 
 To promote Turin as a 
‘Cinema City’ centred 
around the National 
Cinema Museum in 
Mole Antonelliana 
 To improve and 
develop hotel facilities 
for the 2006 Winter 
Olympic Games 
 To develop tourist 
activities linked to sport 
 To build an Olympic 
village to contribute to 
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network 
 To use the 2006 Winter 
Olympic Games as a 
driver for development 
and international 
promotion 
urban regeneration 
 To build new sports 
infrastructures 
To improve the quality of 
the city 
 New ‘centres’ providing 
focal points for local 
facilities; urban renewal 
and social integration 
as a strategy for 
spreading prosperity, 
cohesion and urban 
regeneration 
 Local Agenda 21, 
sustainable 
development and 
environmental 
innovation as the guide 
and foundation for the 
city’s strategies 
 To regenerate 
depressed and/or 
outlying districts on the 
model of the ‘Special 
Project for Peripheral 
Areas’ 
 To develop ‘centres’ of 
urban development and 
local identity in outlying 
districts 
 To create an Urban 
Centre 
 To promote Turin as a 
centre of excellence in 
the non-profit sector 
and to attract the 
European Third-Sector 
Authority to locate in 
the city 
 To reclaim the city’s 
rivers and riverbanks 
 To revive public spaces 
SOURCE: Pinson (2002, pp.486-487). 
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Figure 1. a) Host venues for the Winter Olympic Games, 1924-2018 and b) 
Candidate venues for the Winter Olympic Games, 1924-2022  (Source: 
International Olympic Committee, 2015a). 
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Figure 2 The stadium for the Winter Olympics in Chamonix in 1924. 
(Source: IOC/Olympic Museum Collections. Photograph by Auguste 
Couttet, used in Comité Olympique Français (1924) Rapport Officiel, 
Les Jeux de la VIII Olympiade Paris, COF, Paris, page 648). 
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Figure 3. Comparison of the Olympic facilities provided for the Winter Olympic 
Games of 1932 and 1980 in Lake Placid, USA 
 (Source: III Olympic Winter Games Committee, 1932 and Lake Placid 
Olympic Organising Committee, 1980). 
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Figure 4 The Olympic Village constructed for the Winter Olympics in Grenoble in 
1968. The event was used as a tool of regional development. (Source: 
IOC/Olympic Museum Collections).   
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Figure 5. The regional setting of the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin and the 
Urban Master Plan for the city’s redevelopment devised in 1995. 
(Source: Winkler, 2007) 
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Figure 6.  Redevelopment along the Spina Centrale in Turin, which reconnected 
the two halves of the city previously separated by a railway line, and 
became part of the urban transformations associated with the Winter 
Olympics in 2006. The restored older buildings on the left were 
originally a prison (1870-1986), which now operates as a museum 
(Museo del Carcere Le Nuove). The tower (Il Nuovo Centro Direzionale 
di Torino) is the headquarters of the banking group Intesa, which 
accommodates 2,000 employees together with a 364-seater public hall 
at ground level and a restaurant on the roof. This building was opened 
in December, 2014. (Source: Professor Christopher Balch, Plymouth 
University). 
 
 
 52 
 
Figure 7. The geography of the Winter Olympic Games to be staged in Sochi, 
Russia in 2014 (Source: Sochi Olympic Organising Committee, 2009). 
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Figure 8. The geography of the Winter Olympic Games to be staged in 
PyeongChang, South Korea in 2018 (Source: PyeongChang Olympic 
and Paralympic Winter Games Bid Committee, 2011). 
 
